

Security Council should impose stiffer sanctions on Iran and North Korea. In addition, pending before the Senate is H.R. 7112, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2008. This bill would place new sanctions on Iran. I support such sanctions, and I support similar efforts to establish accountability to the India program.

Another added concern is that India might support Iran's secret weapons program. Already a number of companies in India have been sanctioned under U.S. export control law for providing sensitive missile technologies to Iran. India's export control regime remains deeply flawed. We have a history of this administration not disclosing intelligence information that is derogatory to their argument. In the case of India, the administration did not report export control violations of Indian companies until critical votes had occurred in the House.

What assurances have we received from the administration that they are not withholding critical information at this time from the Congress? The Senate has received a classified annex to the public Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, NPAS, but I would ask, is that document complete? Does it address all the critical questions? I would suggest to my colleagues that, until there is certainty that all the answers to these serious questions are satisfactory; it is better to vote no on this agreement.

Nothing in this agreement would prevent India from further testing of nuclear weapons. Some would argue that it makes it certain that India will continue testing, and, under this legislation, India can continue to receive nuclear materials from other countries even if the United States were to suspend any that it is providing. I believe that it is unlikely that the United States will find much of a new market for its nuclear products should this agreement be approved. India has a history of trading with Russia, France, and others in this area, and trade with these countries will, in the estimation of many experts, prosper.

As Michael Krepon, a noted analyst of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs, has observed, "The upgrading of New Delhi's nuclear forces will most certainly require more nuclear testing." In the case of a test, I believe that India will argue that it was forced to in order to ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal and India's nuclear trading partners will argue against sanctions in the name of preserving what few Indian nuclear facilities remain under IAEA safeguards.

India officials have made it abundantly clear that they maintain the right to test. India's Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, said, "Let me hence reiterate once again that a decision to undertake a future nuclear test would be our sovereign decision, one that rests solely with our government." He noted "We want to keep the

option [of conducting further nuclear tests] open if the situation demands. If the international situation requires, we may have to [conduct nuclear tests]." M.K. Narayanan, a member of India's Atomic Energy Commission, observed that "This deal deals primarily with civil nuclear cooperation. There is no reference here to the event of a test. If there is a test, we come to that later on."

If India does test, Pakistan may retaliate. As Pakistan has already indicated, it would match India step by nuclear step. In April 2006, Pakistan's National Command Authority stated: "In view of the fact the [U.S.-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met." There is already a nuclear and missile weapons race in South Asia. This agreement will only accelerate it, and nuclear tests will fan the flames even hotter. Is this prospect in the interest of the United States? Has a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that such a scenario would enhance our national security?

I return to the questions I posed at the beginning of my statement: does this agreement enhance our international efforts to prevent proliferation, and secondly, will it prevent the further testing of nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent? The answer in both instances is a resounding no, and I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak in support of H.R. 7081, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act.

I had the privilege to be serving as the Democratic leader in the U.S. Senate in late 2006 when, on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, we passed the Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, which laid out the specific steps that needed to be taken in order for our country to achieve a civilian nuclear agreement with the nation of India. At the time, I felt it was important for the Congress to pass the Hyde Act as a critical step in further strengthening the growing political, economic, and security partnership between the United States and India. Today, 2 years later, the Indian government has acted to meet the guidelines set forth in that piece of legislation, allowing us to consider H.R. 7081.

After our two countries reached a consensus on the text of the nuclear cooperation pact this past July, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh faced a tough domestic battle to approve the agreement. However, his government worked diligently to form a coalition of supporters for the nuclear deal, and it eventually passed the Indian Parliament. On Saturday, in the House, Democrats and Republicans approved

H.R. 7081 by a landslide: 298 to 117. Now, we are here today to take the next step in approving this agreement and sending it to the President.

As I did back in late 2006, I would like to remind my fellow Senators how important it is that we approve this measure to expand civilian nuclear cooperation with India. For much of the cold war, America's relationship with India—a leader in the movement of nonaligned countries—was too often characterized by ambivalence on both sides. But in the nearly 20 years since the walls that separated East from West have come down, our two countries have enjoyed an unprecedented level of engagement with one another that has proven truly beneficial for both parties. And the citizens of our two countries are increasingly interconnected through business, educational, and social linkages.

India has emerged as one of the world's most important leaders of the 21st century. India has experienced significant growth in the technological and service sectors, foreign investment has ballooned, and India has become a global center for cultural and artistic expression. The entrepreneurial spirit of the Indian people, coupled with their strong commitment to democratic values, has formed the backbone of a society whose potential for growth knows few boundaries.

By voting for this agreement, the Senate will cement the gains that we have achieved in our bilateral relationship and open two of the world's top scientific communities to the type of civilian nuclear cooperation befitting our strong alliance.

I would like to thank my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who, in conjunction with the Department of State, took the time to examine this agreement over the past 2 weeks. I am equally grateful to Senators DORGAN and BINGAMAN for their willingness to work with the Senate leadership on this important bill. As these two Senators, and others, have pointed out, we cannot undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime's decades of successes, and I appreciate the goals of the Dorgan-Bingaman amendment to ensure the strength of our continued commitments to the nonproliferation regime. I certainly understand the concerns expressed in their amendment, but I believe that this historic agreement provides the necessary safeguards and oversight to ensure that our nonproliferation objectives will be respected.

I also am heartened by the repeated public and private commitments by officials of the U.S. Government to upholding nonproliferation. Because of Senator DORGAN and BINGAMAN's work, the Secretary of State stated in a letter to me today, which has been entered into the record, a clear commitment in the event of a nuclear test. Secretary Rice's letter states: "We've been very clear with the Indians . . . should India test, as it has agreed not